D1.1 FutureTPM Use Case and System Requirements || M06
This deliverable defines the technical requirements of FutureTPM, alongside with the requirements of the use cases. Its purpose to define the parameters for the rest of the FutureTPM project and provide the necessary input to the architecture.

D1.2 FutureTPM Reference Architecture || M09
This deliverable will provide the specification of the FutureTPM reference architecture, the functional components and interfaces between them. It will provide an analysis and point of reference for the FutureTPM in relation to the three specific use cases, including an analysis of relevant classical protocols and the use cases themselves in terms of FutureTPM functionality.

D1.3 Security Risks in QR Deployments || M09
This deliverable will include a documentation of the security problems and risks that classical protocols, to be employed in the three envisioned use cases, might face in the presence of quantum adversaries.

D2.1 First Report on New QR Cryptographic Primitives || M09
This deliverable reports on the work done by all tasks, including the surveys, the newly developed algorithms, and the full specification of the candidate algorithms (TPM and TSS) that are to be implemented and evaluated by WP5.

D3.1 First Report on Security Models for the TPM || M09
Initial report describing and outlining security models for various implementations of TPM.

D4.1Threat Modelling & Risk Assessment Methodology || M12
D4.1 provides the details of the Risk Assessment (RA) methodology that will be followed in FutureTPM towards the design and implementation of a holistic RA framework capable of providing vulnerability analysis and policy enforcement during both design- and run-time. It also provides the analysis of the TPM commands that will be used as the baseline for our investigation (per reference scenario). Each reference scenario will focus on one main TPM functionality including Sealing, Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) and Key Creation and Storage.

D3.2 First Report on the Security of the TPM || M18
In this report, we discuss issues related to modelling and reasoning about trust, usage and authorization policies, and the TPM’s cryptographic primitives, protocols, and realization of access control.

D5.1 First version of implementation || M18
First version of SW based QR TSS and QR TPM.

D4.3 Runtime Risk Assessment, Resilience and Mitigation Planning - First Release || M20
This report provides complementary functionality of the risk assessment framework delivered in D4.2. More specifically, it handles the unacceptable calculated risks by inferring (using backward-chaining techniques) the optimal mitigation actions (i.e., properties that have to be reactively attested) that have to be applied.

D6.3 Demonstrators Implementation Report – First Release || M24
D6.3 provides a detailed documentation of the first round of experiments of the FutureTPM framework, in the context of the three envisioned use cases. It summarizes the operation of the FutureTPM demonstrators coupled with a comprehensive analysis of the integration and evaluation of the first release of the SW-based QR TPM environment enriched with lessons learnt and challenges that need to be taken into consideration during the next development, integration and evaluation cycle of the project.

D2.2 Second Report on New QR Cryptographic Primitives || M26
This document describes the choices (and justification) of the public, symmetric and privacy-enhancing primitives for the TPM constructions.

D3.3 Second Report on Security Models for the TPM || M26
In this report, we deliver two main parts related to the security modelling and models for the TPM. The first part is for the design of ideal functionalities and the second part is for cryptographic model.

D5.4 Report on implementation || M30
This deliverable will report the public overview on the final version of VM based QR TPM, HW based QR TPM and the SW-based QR TPM.

D3.4 Second Report on the Security of the TPM || M31
In this report, we deliver the main contributions towards modelling of TPM abstractions, with the predefined ideal functionalities, and showcase how this can be integrated in the security modelling for a specific application domain (Secure Device Management).